Schizophrenia involves profound but enigmatic disturbances of affective or emotional life. The affective responses as well as expression of many patients in the schizophrenia spectrum can seem odd, incongruent, inadequate, or otherwise off-the-mark. Such patients are, in fact, often described in rather contradictory terms: as being prone both to exaggerated and to diminished levels of emotional or affective response. According to Ernst Kretschmer, they actually tend to have both kinds of experience at the same time. This paper attempts to explain (...) what might be termed this 'Kretschmerian paradox'. Some relevant concepts and vocabulary for affect and emotion are discussed . The need for a phenomenological approach focusing on subjective experience is suggested. Three modes of abnormal experience in schizophrenia are investigated in light of their implications for affect or emotion: alienation of the lived body ; fragmented perception and loss of affordances ; and preoccupation with a quasi-delusional world created by the self. (shrink)

This collection is the final volume of a four book survey of the state of phenomenology fifty years after the death of Edmund Husserl. Its publication represents a landmark in the comprehensive treatment of contemporary phenomenology in all its vastness and richness. The diversity of the issues raised here is dazzling, but the main themes of Husserl's thought are all either explicitly treated, or else they underlie the ingenious approaches found here. Time, historicity, intentionality, eidos, meaning, possibility/reality, and teleology are (...) the main concerns of this collection devoted to studies in aesthetics, metaphysics and literary interpretation, written by such authors as, among others, R. Cobb-Stevens, C. Moreno Marquez, J. Swiecimski, Sitansu Ray and M. Kronegger. These original studies of phenomenological aesthetics and literary theory by scholars from all parts of the world were gathered by the World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learn ing during the year 1988/89 during its assessment of the phenomeno logical movement, fifty years after Husserl's death. IX A -T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XXXVII, ix. (shrink)

Purpose. To consider the uniqueness of Descartes’ way of interpreting poetry as a type of philosophizing that makes it possible to comprehend the metaphysical nature of man. Its implementation involves the consistent solution of the following tasks: a) understanding methodological changes in the philosophy of the 20th century in the process of actualization of anthropological interest; b) argumentation of the importance of poetic thinking for early Descartes in the process of addressing modern historians of philosophy and the thinker’s texts. Theoretical (...) basis. I rely on the conceptual positions of phenomenology, existentialism and hermeneutics. Originality. Finding of the study is that poetic thinking is the most authentic way of meaningful comprehension of the metaphysicity of man. The paper outlines the nature of the expression of this correlation in the philosophizing of the 20th-21th centuries and substantiates the thesis about the importance of the poetic principle for understanding the phenomenon of man in early works by Descartes. Conclusions. The paper examined the methodological shifts in anthropologically oriented philosophizing of the 20th-21th centuries and focused on the manifestations of related moments in the philosophical legacy of Descartes. The latter demonstrates the existence of a still underestimated version of interpreting the metaphysical foundations of human existence, the form of understanding of which is poetic thinking. It is a form of caring for the humane in man. (shrink)

This book is concerned with the history of metaphysics since Descartes. Taking as its definition of metaphysics 'the most general attempt to make sense of things', it charts the evolution of this enterprise through various competing conceptions of its possibility, scope, and limits. The book is divided into three parts, dealing respectively with the early modern period, the late modern period in the analytic tradition, and the late modern period in non-analytic traditions. In its unusually wide range, A. (...) W. Moore's study refutes the tired old cliché that there is some unbridgeable gulf between analytic philosophy and philosophy of other kinds. It also advances its own distinctive and compelling conception of what metaphysics is and why it matters. Moore explores how metaphysics can help us to cope with continually changing demands on our humanity by making sense of things in ways that are radically new. (shrink)

Examines the relationship between the question of God and the destiny of metaphysics. Concept of the end of metaphysics; Ambiguous relation between phenomenology and metaphysics; Return of special metaphysics in phenomenology; Phenomenological figure of God. Examines the relationship between the question of God and the destiny of metaphysics. Concept of the end of metaphysics; Ambiguous relation between phenomenology and metaphysics; Return of special metaphysics in phenomenology; Phenomenological figure of God.

Intended as an introduction of the phenomenological writings of Pfänder to English-speaking readers, this work contains two major essays and two minor selections by Pfänder, plus an introduction and two appendixes by Spiegelberg. Because of its composition, this book should be classified as a Pfänder's anthology centered around a main essay titled "Motives and Motivation." As reasons for the translation and publishing of this main essay, Spiegelberg mentions first its influence on Ricoeur's phenomenology of the will, and secondly its (...) topical affinity with R. S. Peter's The Concept of Motivation, a work considered by Spiegelberg as capable of restoring the importance of the will in Anglo-American philosophy. The other major essay is, curiously enough, the introduction to a text-book in logic written by Pfänder in response to Husserl's own request. The two essays, though different, are not unrelated; they represent the theoretical and practical sides of the unique phenomenological method of constitution. The presence of these two essays, side by side, in this volume raises in fact the question of Pfänder's own understanding of the theoretical unity of thought and action that is the key to phenomenological subjectivity. A clarification of Pfänder's thought on this unity would certainly help us evaluate his contribution to phenomenology. Spiegelberg himself depicts Pfänder as a reasonable phenomenologist, accurate in analysis and moderate in speculative claims, a sober figure indeed in an environment sometimes seen as prone to intellectual excesses.--A. de L. M. (shrink)

Attempts to introduce phenomenology to the English-speaking world have often been hampered by the specialist's tendency to substitute a part for the whole--thereby threatening the delicate balance guaranteed by the transcendental turn and so carefully maintained by Husserl throughout his-philosophical career. Thus some, in their concern to place Husserl in the context of the realism-idealism issue, have stressed the contrast between Ideen and some aspects of Krisis. Others, relying on the illuminating power of the notion of human roles, have devoted (...) themselves exclusively to the working out of a mundane phenomenology with or without ontological pretensions. While there is value to be found in this branching out of the research, it nevertheless needs to be integrated. Because of the character of the phenomenological synthesis, moreover, such integration cannot be achieved simply by generalists. Hence the value of scholars like Kockelmans whose experience in more than one type of reduction permits them to move readily from one level of intentionality to another. As the book amply demonstrates, Kockelmans has acquired this multiple capability by following in detail Husserl's philosophical development as it progressively opens the way to the exploration of all these levels. In commenting upon this development, he is also rendering an invaluable service by bringing to light many of Husserl's writings which otherwise might remain unknown to the interested student. The work is concise, a model of balance between exposition of the doctrine and clarification of the issues; in short, an excellent and welcome addition to the phenomenological literature.-A. M. (shrink)

Purpose. To consider the personal nature of Cartesian metaphysics. Its implementation involves: a) outlining methodological changes in the philosophy of the twentieth century; b) analysis of ways to interpret anthropological component of philosophizing in Descartes studies; c) appeal to Descartes’ texts to clarify the authentic form of his interpretation of metaphysics. Theoretical basis. I base my view of Descartes’ legacy on the conceptual positions of phenomenology, existentialism and hermeneutics. Originality. Based on Descartes’ own concept of teaching, the author (...) substantiates the personal nature of Cartesian metaphysics. Important prerequisites for its comprehension are attention to the ethical motive as the driving force of philosophizing and recognition of the importance of the poetic worldview. The idea of the basic role of poetics finds its meaningful confirmation in the texts of the philosopher, who interprets the main areas of philosophy as the forms of art. Conclusions. Based on his own vision of anthropology and metaphysics as the forms of completion of the revolution initiated by Copernicus, the author defends the idea of the constitutive presence of personality in Descartes’ metaphysics. In the process of studying the research literature, methodological guidelines are outlined in the form of the importance of personal determination of the search for truth, the key role of ethical motive and art as components of philosophizing. The thesis about the poetic form of presentation of metaphysics by Descartes as a form of fixation of its personal dimension is substantiated. (shrink)

Given recent developments in Franco‐German phenomenology with its so‐called ‘theological turn’, there has been a concomitant renewal of interest in Maurice Blondel's thought. In this paper I consider the phenomenological structure of Blondel's early philosophy. Blondel defended and published his controversial thesis in 1893 and with this work presented a highly original phenomenology that was deeply indebted to the positive tradition and yet went beyond this same tradition to include even religious practice as part of its inquiry. Keen to (...) engage the rationalist philosophers of the French academy, Blondel proposed a phenomenological project that was geared to engage the critical spirit of an age that was already deemed to be post‐metaphysical. It is in clarifying the manner in which Blondel conceives such a positive phenomenology that I indicate how his thought may contribute to contemporary debates in the phenomenology of religion. (shrink)

This book offers fresh perspective on the role of phenomenology in the philosophy of physics which opens new avenues for discussion among physicists, "standard" philosophers of physics and philosophers with phenomenological leanings. Much has been written on the interrelations between philosophy and physics in the late 19th and early 20th century, and on the emergence of philosophy of science as an autonomous philosophical sub-discipline. This book is about the under-explored role of phenomenology in the development and the philosophical interpretation (...) of 20th century physics. Part 1 examines questions about the origins and value of phenomenological approaches to physics. Does the work of classical phenomenologists such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty or Heidegger contain elements of systematic value to both the practice and our philosophical understanding of physics? How did classical phenomenology influence “standard” philosophy of science in the Anglo-American and other traditions? Part 2 probes questions on the role of phenomenology in the philosophies of physics and science: - Can phenomenology help to solve “Wigner’s puzzle”, the problem of the "unreasonable effectiveness" of mathematics in describing, explaining and predicting empirical phenomena? - Does phenomenology allow better understanding of the principle of gauge invariance at the core of the standard model of contemporary particle physics? - Does the phenomenological notion of “Lifeworld” stand in opposition to the “scientific metaphysics” movement, or is there potential for dialogue? Part 3 examines the measurement problem. Is the solution outlined by Fritz London and Edmond Bauer merely a re-statement of von Neumann’s view, or should it be regarded as a distinctively phenomenological take on the measurement problem? Is phenomenology a serious contender in continuing discussions of foundational questions of quantum mechanics? Can other interpretational frameworks such as quantum Bayesianism benefit from implementing phenomenological notions such as constitution or horizonal intentionality? (shrink)

An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingent.There are two main issues to address. The first is that ‘collateral’ beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this (...) still assigns an essential role to belief in perception, though the belief may be of an attenuated form. The second is Fred Dretske’s claim that even attenuated belief may be entirely absent from perception. It is argued that ‘non-epistemic’ perception can be understood only by employing the concept of ‘epistemic’ perception; that the former can occur only partially---i.e., within perceptions that are otherwise epistemic; and that by switching attention from the perception of objects to the Phenomenological tradition’s concern with the perception of world, we can see that perception must be entirely permeated with ‘doxastic’ force. (shrink)

This book is a splendid piece of editing. Its format is tripartite: a consideration of specifically Husserlian themes, such as intersubjectivity, reduction, the life-world, intentionality, and constitution by distinguished Husserlian scholars and, in two instances, Husserl himself; the translation and adaptation of phenomenology into existential phenomenology, the illustration of which is centered around selections from Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty with commentary support from Kockelmans, Schrag, Edie, Kwant, Natanson, and Spiegelberg; the exemplary deployment of phenomenology into the area of the human (...) sciences, particularly psychology. In this last part the uniformly solid though sometimes non-harmonious interpretations of the relation between phenomenology and psychology are proffered by Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Kockelmans, Strasser, and Schuetz. This book would provide excellent supplementary reading for any course in phenomenology or existential phenomenology, and, in addition, for any course in the philosophy of the social sciences.—E. A. R. (shrink)

In these lectures, given at Göttingen in 1904-1910, Husserl describes the phenomenological content of lived experiences of time, Zeiterlebnisse, and defines the differences between acts of consciousness. He carefully shows how inner time is constituted as a continuum through the retentional modifications of consciousness. Consciousness is not merely temporal; it is temporality and the basis for the constitution of objective time. The translation is crystal-clear, though this makes the doctrine no less difficult. This early work shows that Husserl practiced (...) phenomenology before he formulated its methodological principles in the Ideen.—A. B. D. (shrink)

Fifteen essays by as many contributors with a summative introduction by Edie. The contributors are Dreyfus, Adamczewski, Earle, Compton, J. E. Smith, J. M. Anderson, Natanson, Silber, Crosson, Molina, G. E. Myers, Tillman, W. J. Richardson, Langan, and Findlay. All of the essays were presented in one form or another at one of the last three meetings of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Some of them have been considerably reworked and expanded, the most important of which is John (...) Silber's fifty-seven page paper, "Being and Doing." Silber subjects the contemporary analytical version of voluntary responsibility, as found paradigmaticaliy in H. L. A. Hart's work, to a severe critique, arguing that a notion of status responsibility which involves following intentions and motives back to their pre-thematic roots in attitudes and a whole style of life, or way of being, is more consonant with human experience and nature than the antiseptic notion of responsibility developed by Hart. Even Hampshire takes his lumps at Silber's hands. Other excellent papers include Findlay's "Essential Probabilities," which can be read as a plea for a material logic, and Richardson's "Kant and the Late Heidegger," which uses Heidegger's reflection on the Kantian problematic to examine the issue of the continuity between the early and the later Heidegger. Not all of the essays approach the standards of these three, but for a collection of papers that have only the meeting of the same society in common, this is better than most.—E. A. R. (shrink)

Eighteen of Straus' papers, published in various journals and anthologies between 1930 and 1962, are included in this volume. They are divided into three sections: Phenomenological Studies, Anthropological Studies, and Clinical Studies. But cutting across these divisions is the recurring philosophical theme of the inadequacy of the behavioristic ideal in psychology and the similar inadequacy of the reductionistic mentality of that strain of contemporary philosophy which nurtures this ideal. Straus' critical moments are often more whimsical and polemical than philosophical. (...) But the real strength of the organic approach he defends are his specific analyses of such phenomena as memory, wakefulness, hallucinations, and human action. His phenomenological methods join up with rather than defer to the more rigorously philosophical versions thereof, and "make sense" out of the phenomena in a way that a logically, or ontologically, straightjacketed method might find impossible. This is not to make the trivial point that, in the end, Straus is a scientist, not a philosopher; he is a scientist, but one who has something philosophical to say. Among other important papers are included "The Upright Posture," "Lived Movement," and "Descartes' Significance for Modern Psychology."—E. A. R. (shrink)

Chauchard has given a neurophysiological transcription of the evolutionary thought of Teilhard, which should give his critics, scientific, philosophical, and theological, reason to pause and reassess the place of his thought in all of these areas. Teilhard was basically a scientist, according to Chauchard. He attempts to show that scientific phenomenology, which allows its categories to be shaped by the dynamic in addition to the formal, mathematical structure of its subject matter, is just as legitimately a scientific method as what (...) has passed as such for so long. In particular, scientific phenomenology allows the neuro-physiologist to speak of subjectivity in an appropriately scientific way that cuts away the false dichotomy between the "subjective" and "objective," which invariably invites the reduction of either one to the other, or leaves them side by side in an incommunicable dualism.—E. A. R. (shrink)

_Purpose__._ The authors aim to reveal the peculiarity of comprehension of the human phenomenon in the process of referring to the text of "Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime" by the early Immanuel Kant, which is based on the critical rethinking of the Enlightenment position. A prerequisite for its substantial solution is addressing the problem of the place of the "Observations" in the evolution of Kant’s anthropological views. _Theoretical basis__._ Our view of Kant’s legacy is based upon (...) the conceptual positions of phenomenology, existentialism and hermeneutics. _Originality__._ We have proved that the anthropological interest was inherent in Kant already in the pre-critical stage of his work, as shown by the still underestimated treatise "Observation". The paper give arguments that this text highlights the main topics that will later be the subject of a detailed study of both Kant himself and philosophical anthropology of the 20th century. It is revealed that Kant overcomes the Enlightenment temptation to absolutize the power of human reason and emphasizes its limitations. The specified step is a necessary condition for him to comprehend the important role of the sensual-passionate component of human nature and to recognize the importance of the metaphysical nature of man. _Conclusions._ For us today, the pre-critical Kant appears as the developer of anthropological teaching, first presented in the treatise "Observations". Already at this stage, Kant demonstrates a holistic vision of human nature. In the process of creative evolution of the thinker, this treatise should be qualified as a kind of sketch of the future concentrated development of human nature, elaborated in the pages of "Anthropology" in 1798. The author gives a key place to the metaphysics of human nature, a vivid illustration of which is, in particular, the last paragraph of "Observations" dedicated to freedom. The conducted analysis provides sufficient grounds for qualifying this text as an outline of the anthropological basis of his doctrine of pure reason, the doctrine of metaphysics as the metaphysics of man, which, in turn, gives us the key to understanding "Anthropology" as his final text. (shrink)

The essays in this volume are certainly first rate, as is Natanson's introduction, which attempts to outline the more salient features of phenomenology as a method for philosophy and a philosophical evaluation of the other sciences. Included are Erwin Straus' "The Upright Posture," a translation of Sartre's "Faces" and "Official Portraits," Schutz's "Some Leading Concepts of Phenomenology," and Spiegelberg's "How Subjective is Phenomenology?" A balance between actual phenomenological analyses and historical and critical evaluations of phenomenology itself is attempted and (...) achieved. Other contributors include Aron Gurwitsch, James Street Fulton, Harmon Chapman, Michael Kullman and Charles Taylor, Fritz Kaufmann, and Paul-Louis Landsberg.—E. A. R. (shrink)

This book of readings would make a superb ancillary text for an advanced or even graduate course in "existential phenomenology." Twelve of the twenty-two selections have been translated for the first time into English. This includes Sartre's defense of the major theses of Being and Nothingness before the Société française de philosophie and Ric£ur's similar defense of La Philosophie de la Volonté, I before the same body. As with Merleau-Ponty's similar defense, "The Primacy of Perception," also included in this volume, (...) the discussion which followed these defenses is presented. Integral texts in the form of articles rather than extracts from books are presented in most cases, including the first appearance of an essay by Marcel entitled "Desire and Hope." Where this is not done, as is partly the case for Strasser and wholly the case for Scheler, Dufrenne, Wild, and Ingarden, lengthy and context-faithful excerpts are given. There are four sections in the book: I. Existence in the Modalities of Consciousness, II. Existence as Embodied, III. Existence and Value, and IV. Existence and the Human Sciences. Each of these sections is skillfully laid out and effectively introduced. In addition to the philosophers mentioned, work by Buytendijk, May, Schutz, Van Kaam, Berger, Bollnow, Minkowski, Straus, and de Waelhens is included. Husserl is missing, as is Heidegger, but these gaps can be supplemented easily enough.—E. A. R. (shrink)

Eighteen of Gurwitsch's papers, all previously published between 1929 and 1961; nine of the papers appear in English for the first time. With the exception of the mainly expository "The Last Work of Edmund Husserl," in which Gurwitsch limns the structure of Husserl's Krisis, all of the papers are serious forays into "constitutive" as distinguished from "existential" phenomenology. At times Gurwitsch goes about his business historically, engaging Descartes, Kant, a good deal of Hume, James, and, of course, Husserl in dialogue. (...) In almost half of the papers Gestalt psychology, the psychological and biological work of Gelb and Goldstein, and the distinctively psychological work of James are the focus. The dominant theme of all the studies is consciousness and an exploration of the logical rather than existential problematic of intentionality. Gurwitsch wishes his work to be assessed as part of the Husserlian program of radically founding in the constituting consciousness all the systematized noematic fruits, i.e., sciences, of this same consciousness.. He is, however, a self-confessed heretic from the strict Husserlian point of view, having abandoned the doctrines of hyletic data, and, more interestingly, the egological root of consciousness.—E. A. R. (shrink)

Based on the Mahlon Powell lectures given at Indiana University, this slim, well translated book is surprisingly rich and visionary in its pursuit of a metaphysics of language. Dufrenne, a phenomenologist, argues that positivistic and syntactical linguistics wrongly ignore the phenomenon of living speech, while formal logic, seeking to rid itself of its natural and intuitive origins, is necessarily rooted in them. What is needed is a phenomenology of human speech which would lead to a metaphysics of man's (...) spoken intercourse with the world. In the end, poetry has the last word.--A. B. D. (shrink)

The discussion on the phenomenology of life will continue to be crucial to the general outlook and direction of phenomenological investigations. The imp- tance of it is not only the fact that it is an innovation in the philosophical circle, but it is also an effort that contributes to the re-reading of the hitherto ex- gerated differences between phenomenology and metaphysics. What is new and signi?cant about life is that even though it is evident in the?ow of the (...) history of philosophy, no philosopher has seriously addressed it. Not many philosophers have said something in particular about life in serious philoso- ical re?ection. The discussion on life by Henri Bergson attests to this and one 3 can hardly point to other deep re?ections elsewhere about the subject. The advantage here about our area is not only that it has extended the horizon of phenomenological thinking, it has also helped to lead phenomenology from the constitutive analysis to a creative impetus that has brought a new point of view to the?eld, hence raising questions about the general philosophical t- dition from ancient times. This is a reading which my philosophy attempts to investigate about Tymienieckan thought. The emphasis in philosophy till now has been more on reason in its int- lection and pure rational dimension based on the earliest conception of the human person distinguished by rationality. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of some ideas about narrow content owing to Horgan and Tienson and Brian Loar.

Sixteen articles by fifteen authors, two of which, the ones by Plantinga and Kenny, have never appeared in this form before. Three of the selections have been translated for the first time from French: those by B. A. O. Williams, E. Bréhier, and P. H. J. Hoenen. The latter two selections are the sole representatives of French Cartesian scholarship. This is unfortunate, as Descartes' positive contribution to modern philosophy is better reflected in recent phenomenological and existential philosophy. The dominant (...) tone of this volume is negative and piecemeal, though in terms of this limited approach to Cartesian studies there are many excellent essays in this volume. The balance of the contributors includes Ayer, Moore, Ryle, A. K. Stout, Malcolm, Hintikka, Gewirth, Prichard, Frankfurt, and Alston. The editor has included a very comprehensive bibliography.—E. A. R. (shrink)

Where does the mind begin and end? Most philosophers and cognitive scientists take the view that the mind is bounded by the skull or skin of the individual. Robert Wilson, in this provocative and challenging 2004 book, provides the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual. The approach adopted offers a unique blend of traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. The companion volume, Genes and the (...) Agents of Life, explores the theme in the biological sciences. Written with verve and clarity, this ambitious book will appeal to a broad swathe of professionals and students in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and the history of the behavioural and human sciences. You can download the table of contents here. (shrink)

Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding is an anthology of articles on themes common both to phenomenology and other philosophical positions, especially those within the analytic tradition. All of the essays are previously unpublished and were written specifically for this volume; among the authors represented are both phenomenologists and nonphenomenologists. “Phenomenology” means usually Husserl’s phenomenology, although there is discussion of other representatives as well.

The author adopts a phenomenalistic method to educe, not the content of universally valid moral judgments, but "the generic characteristics of all moral experience." Interested in describing rather than prescribing the standards of judgment, he finds that the common ground lies in a contextual "fittingness." The possibility of validating moral judgment is maintained by the enunciation of principles of the primacy of facts, of universality, and of ultimacy or obligation.--A. R.

Science naively presupposes the intelligibility of the universe, necessary laws, and a universal truth. The author reflects on these presuppositions to arrive at a demonstration of God's existence. In a vigorous and exclamatory style, he condemns the alternative views of idealism, phenomenology, and philosophies of science which cannot rationally justify their faith in a universal truth. The only rational basis for these presuppositions is a theistic God--the "Vérité mesurante" and "Pensée fondatrice" of scientific reason.--A. B. D.

This volume is made up of essays about logic, rather than essays in logic. They range from a critique of the foundations of logic, e.g., Egidi's essay, "The Internal Crisis of Logicism," to excellent phenomenological analyses on the genetics of logic, e.g., P. Filiasi Carcano's "Psychoanalysis of Logic," and S. Piro's fresh approach to the semantics of the schizophrenic. In the middle of this spectrum we find good surveys of the main trends of logical work. The best essay, by (...) E. Paci: "Foundation and Logical Construction of the World in Carnap," brings life to the no man's land between logical literature and phenomenology. The important contributions of Paci, and his bridging role with regard to all living philosophical trends should receive prompt attention in the United States.—A. M. (shrink)

"One basic and underlying assumption of this investigation will be that there is a distinct continuity and development in Berkeley's thought which can be traced through all of his reflective analyses of the problem of perception." The essay argues for Berkeley's theory of perception as a "prototype of the phenomenalists." It argues also for Berkeley's incorporation of elements from the representative theory of perception. Of special interest is the treatment of Berkeley's doctrine of "suggestion" and its connection with the role (...) of imagination in the perception of physical objects. The linguistic aspect of Berkeley's work is minimized. Berkeley's theory of notions receives only a passing reference. The last third of the book is a clear and useful discussion of Berkeley and contemporary phenomenalism. It is suggested, though not shown, that Berkeley has affinity with contemporary phenomenology of perception.--A. S. C. (shrink)

These fragmentary and often repetitious papers-some of them published before Schutz's death--are organized under three headings: 1) On the Methodology of the Social Sciences, 2) Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, and 3) Symbol, Reality and Society. Schutz elaborates the structures of the "natural attitude," earlier described by Husserl, and defends the irreducible reality of the Lebenswelt which is necessarily presupposed by science, knowledge, language, and the interpretation of signs. Intersubjectivity is at the core of the Lebenswelt and Schutz ably criticizes (...) the inadequate work done by Husserl, Scheler and Sartre on the problem of the other. The tone of all the papers is expository and critical rather than original, as if Schutz was preparing his own views by "working through" a host of other writers.--A. B. D. (shrink)

This is the first of a two part study on Croce that ought to give a significant turn to current interpretation of this author as well as to current opinion about his value. Bausola leaves for the second part discussion of Croce's vitalism in its variations, and also the ethical and political themes in which the Croce-Marx relation finds expression. This first part deals mostly with logical and ontological themes, all of them connected by Croce's constant struggle against any form (...) of transcendence. One would think that what is dead in Croce is precisely his ontological theory, while his philosophy of praxis, because of its emphasis on freedom, would more likely be alive and full of interesting suggestions for the present. The two fundamental contributions of this work are: the new light that it throws upon Croce's speculations on the concept of "concept," and its "phenomenological" understanding of Croce's distinction between the impossibility of transcending consciousness and the impossibility of objectifying it. Since these interpretations are made in the light of Croce's ideas, Bausola's work has the effect of bringing back the voice of Croce into the present dialogue on the question of immanence and transcendence.--A. M. (shrink)

The philosophy of Max Scheler is hardly of the type that can stand compendious presentation. Obsessed by such clear distinctions as the analytic vs. the synthetic, mind vs. matter, and metaphysics vs. science, Scheler proposed still further ontological distinctions which often presented more problems than the distinctions they were designed to replace. Moreover, having renounced any diagnostic use of scientific materials, Scheler had to resort to tedious descriptions that would allow him to bridge the gap between common sense and (...) rational consistency. When the presentation of his doctrine is simply outlined, as it is in this book, the play with alternative ontological distinctions becomes conspicuously irrelevant. The rich insight so frequently hiding in descriptive detail and suggesting a myriad of fertile directions, cannot be reduced to the outline's topic headings. One wonders if any critical examination of Scheler in these terms can be fair, or even if it is worthwhile to know only that much about Scheler.--A. M. (shrink)

Edie's introduction, caustic notes, and select bibliography provide a rich summary of the philosophical ancestry and development of the movement. He equitably judges Heidegger's "second period" and points out the intimate relation of James' pragmatism to the phenomenological method. Thevenaz's four essays--less exciting because of their academic flavor--are divided into the title essay, an essay on the radicalism of Descartes and Husserl, and two devoted to the author's own philosophy of "reflexive analysis" and his interpretation of metaphysical questioning. The (...) book serves the two-fold purpose of presenting advanced introductions both to phenomenology and to Thevenaz's "protestant philosophy," which critically modify the former.--A. B. (shrink)

Shapiro tests these hypotheses against two rivals, the mental constraint thesis and the embodied mind thesis. Collecting evidence from a variety of sources (e.g., neuroscience, evolutionary theory, and embodied cognition) he concludes that the multiple realizability thesis, accepted by most philosophers as a virtual truism, is much less obvious than commonly assumed, and that there is even stronger reason to give up the separability thesis. In contrast to views of mind that tempt us to see the mind as simply being (...) resident in a brain or body, Shapiro argues for a far more encompassing integration of mind, brain, and body than philosophers have supposed. (publisher, edited). (shrink)

A discussion of the concept of Descriptive v Revisionary Metaphysics as it applies to the work of P.F. Strawson amongst others.

Anthony Freeman's article on transpersonal psychology cited Jorge Ferrer's criticism that while the field claims to be non-dualistic or 'post-Cartesian' (no subject -object or mind-body split), it is nevertheless hopelessly dualistic. . .Freeman proposes a way of salvation for transpersonal psychology by invoking Daniel Dennettapos;s concept of heterophenomenology, which is a third-person investigation of someone elseapos;s first-person experience (as reported). . .Freeman's proposal is a fine demonstration of lateral thinking, calling upon atheist Dennett in support of transpersonal and religious inquiry. (...) Unfortunately, it is a solution analogous to searching for lost keys under the lamppost where the light is better. (shrink)

IN A recent work I have attempted to show that visual space tends to have a Euclidean geometrical structure only when the environment is filled with a repetitive pattern of regularly faceted objects carpentered to exhibit simple standard Euclidean shapes, and tends to have a hyperbolic structure when vision is deprived of these clues. I conclude that visual perception--and by analogy, all perception--is hermeneutic as well as causal: it responds to structures in the flow of optical energy, but the character (...) of its response is also hermeneutical, that is, it has the capacity to "read" the appropriate structures in the World, and to form perceptual judgments of the World about which these "speak." The clues that are "read" perceptually as giving a Euclidean visual space are engineered objects, such as streets and buildings with repetitive architectural elements. These scientific artifacts of human culture belong to a family of readable technologies central to the phenomenological and existential-hermeneutical analysis of natural science. (shrink)

This study aims, first, to delimit the seemingly synonymous concepts of “phenomenon” and “appearance” and second, to trace the functions of each in Kant’s philosophy and the phenomenological tradition. The analy­sis is based on Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the central works of Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink. Kant does not explicitly distinguish the two terms and only speaks about phenomena when he deals with the categorial application of reason. With Husserl, appearance is linked with the area (...) of the natural attitude while the phenomenon is absolute. Fink’s position is interesting in that it differs from the views of the main representatives of transcendental philosophy, Kant and Husserl. According to Fink, appearing is the foundation of the fact that what exists is and that appearing is being. Fink takes a different approach to the meanings of appearance as opposing the thing in itself which possesses true but unknowable being and appearance as taking place in the “relative” sphere of the natural attitude : with Fink, appearance turns out to be the condition of the existence of objects. Appearance, understood through the prism of the human being which perceives something as Vorschein, implies an inherently open world. Following Fink, I analyse these provisions and examine, first, light as the metaphysical source of cognition, second, the human being as a special kind of being, third, the pre-Socratic treatment of being and, fourth, the formation of a distinct phenomenological idiom. I come to the conclusion that the metaphysical-ontological method of phenomenological analysis of appearance proposed by Fink affords a new insight into the a priori principle and the nature of Kant’s “thing in itself” and proposes a new grounding of Husserl’s thesis which questions Kant’s agnosticism. (shrink)

This essay aims to critically assess the later Foucault's ethical turn by using Levinas's ethical metaphysics as critical yardstick. Foucault's notion of ethical subjectivity constitutes a site of resistance against externally imposed subjugating subject identities. Apart from a practice of freedom, Foucault also insists that it engenders the subject with a generous responsiveness towards others. Despite Foucault's other-aspirations, it seems probable that care of the self would fall short ethically when compared to Levinas's insistence upon an unconditional openness towards (...) the Other. Upon closer investigation, however, we find that Levinas's ethical metaphysics is founded upon phenomenological analyses of our immanent 'economic' existence here and now in the world. Although he maintains that metaphysics or 'transcendence, the welcoming of the other by the same' (Levinas, 1979:43/13) is primary, the immanent process of the subject's 'auto-personification' ( ibid ., p.147/120) serves as a necessary condition for the possibility of becoming ethical, of welcoming the Other. Moreover, contrary to Foucault's self-caring subject, who actively partakes in its own ethical self-formation, Levinas's existent has no educable ethical sensibility. It is powerless against the gravitational pull of its egoism, condemned to a hopeless amorality unless the Other intervenes and saves it from itself. I shall therefore argue that Foucault's account of ethical self-becoming invests the subject with a meta -physical potential, which it is denied by Levinas's ethical metaphysics. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 25(2) 2006: 113-125. (shrink)